Mobile-IPv6 technology brings us convenient but also produces a series of security issues. Virtual private networks allow two or more parties to communicate securely over a public network. VPNs provide the assurance such as confidentiality, host authentication and data integrity by using cryptographic algorithms and protocols. In this article the concepts of mobile IP was introduced and the security problem was analyzed. A VPN implemented with the IP Security Protocol (IPSec) is presented to protect the communication between Mobile Node and Home Agent. According to special demands of mobile network, a secure mobile-IPv6 network model is presented based on IPSec. With this kind of model the high security and reliability can be achieved.
Introduction
The Internet Protocol (IP) was developed in the late '60s to allow a small number of people to communicate. At that time mobility was not a requirement, but now people would prefer to be able to roam from network to network seamlessly. So Mobile-IP was developed to do that. With Mobile IP technology people could be more easily access to the Internet or Intranet. IPv6 is a new version of IP which is designed to be an evolutionary step from IPv4. In Mobile IPv6 it is no need to deploy special routers as "foreign agents", as in Mobile IPv4. Mobile IPv6 operates in any location without any special support required from the local router. It supports for route optimization as a fundamental part of the protocol, rather than a nonstandard set of extensions. The IPv6 Neighbor Unreachability Detection assures symmetric reachability between the mobile node and its default router in the current location. Mobile IPv6 is decoupled from any particular link layer, as it uses IPv6 Neighbor Discovery instead of ARP. The dynamic home agent address discovery mechanism in Mobile IPv6 returns a single reply to the mobile node. The directed broadcast approach used in IPv4 returns separate replies from each home agent. This also improves the robustness of the protocol. Most packets sent to a mobile node while away from home in Mobile IPv6 are sent using an IPv6 routing header rather than IP encapsulation, reducing the amount of resulting overhead compared to Mobile IPv4. To allow a Mobile Node (MN) to move between networks with its stationary IP address, there should be a Home Agent.
Home Agent is a router on the network where the mobile node normally resides. When a Mobile Node is not physically connected to the home network, it tunnels datagrams to the home network and maintains current location information for the home agent. Mobile node can acquire its care-of address (COA) through conventional IPv6 mechanisms, such as stateless or stateful auto-configuration when it is on a foreign network. COA is a unicast routable address associated with a mobile node while visiting a foreign link; the subnet prefix of this IP address is a foreign subnet prefix. Among the multiple care-of addresses that a mobile node may have at any given time (e.g., with different subnet prefixes), the one registered with the mobile node's home agent for a given home address is called its "primary" care-of address [1] . A mobile node is given a fixed IP address on a home network. This home address is administered in the same way as a "permanent" IP address is provided to a stationary host. When away from its home network, a "care-of address" is associated with the mobile node and reflects the mobile node's current point of attachment.
The mechanism of mobile-IPv6
Mobile nodes (MNs) may advertise their presence by sending agent advertisement and work as follows: 1. A mobile node (MN) could receive the advertisements of HA to determine whether it is on the home network or the foreign network. If a MN is on the home network, it works like the fixed host. If it is on the foreign network it acts independent of the HA. It registers the COA to HA using a Registration Request, HA sends a Registration Reply which will notify the MN whether HA refuses or receives the request [2] . 2. If the process of registration is completed, datagrams sent to the home network are intercepted by the HA. They are encapsulated in a new datagram that contains the care-of address and sent to the mobile node. 3. The mobile node registers its current binding at the correspondent node through standard routing technology to the correspondent node. It does not need to use tunnel technology. 4. Packets from the correspondent node can be routed directly to the care-of address of the mobile node. When sending a packet to any IPv6 destination, the correspondent node checks its cached bindings for an entry for the packet's destination address. If a cached binding for this destination address is found, the node uses a new type of IPv6 routing header to route the packet to the mobile node by way of the care-of address indicated in this binding.
The issues of security of mobile-IPv6
But mobile-IPv6 communication passes through both wireless and cable links. If proper method is not adopted there will be more chances to be attacked. Mobile-IPv6 itself does not offer security features such as access restrictions in foreign networks. Now along with new technology dramatic growth in the number of device which can perform as IP hosts, such as packet PCs, mobile phones, and other applications are developed and MNs frequently roam among the networks. Because MNs often change their positions, so the optimal routing is needed. If the nodes process an optimal routing, they have to send update bonding datagrams. If the update bonding datagrams were not authenticated, an attacker could forge them and send them to any node in the Internet. So the threats which are focus on the bonding update messages between MN and HA or CN should be paid more attention.
In any networked environment precautions should be taken to prevent what are called 'insider attacks'.These are attacks come from supposedly trustworthy own employees of the company. Although this is not specific to mobile IP as such, we will just discuss Mobile IPv6 here. security aspects are briefly conclude on Mobile IPv6 such as follows:
• Redirect Attacks: the data should be sent to the node A but it is redirected to node B. For example, MN is communicating with node B, if attacker acknowledges the home address of node A, he could send data packets to node A. In the bonding update messages it contained the care-of-address of C (the attacker's address) and the options of node B's home address. Node A does not know whether the node B is in a mobile state and receives this update bonding messages without authentication. So the mobile node A would redirection the information to node C. So the session between node A and B is stolen by node C.
• Reflection attacks: When MN is communicating with Node B, if node B receives a request data packet from node A, it should send a reply data packet to node A. But if node A sends a request data packet, as result node B sends a reply data packet to node C. The attacker could imply the reflection attacks through bonding updates.
• Replay attacks: MN can record the bonding information which was authenticated. An attacker can save a valid information and replays it after a period. So he can register a forged COA.
• Man in the middle attacks: When the attacker controls the link between node A and node B, he can modify the bonding update datagrams and implies the reflection attacks.
VPN and IPSec
IPv6 was designed to support IPsec and complete implementations of IPv6 will include IPsec. For securing the Internet traffic, Internet Protocol Security (IPSec) standard was developed by the Internet Engineering Task Force. IPSec provides a variety of security services at the IP layer that includes access control, connectionless integrity, data origin authentication, protection against replays (a form of partial sequence integrity), confidentiality (encryption). IPsec uses two protocols to provide traffic security, Authentication Header (AH) and Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP). AH provides connectionless integrity, data origin authentication, and an optional anti-replay service. The ESP may provide confidentiality (encryption), and limited traffic flow confidentiality. It also may provide connectionless integrity, data origin authentication, and an anti-replay service. ESP employs symmetric-key encryption algorithms such as RC5 and 3DES to provide confidentiality. ESP uses keyed hash algorithms such as SHA-1 and MD5. Both the AH and ESP insure the authenticity as well as the integrity of the IP packet payload using symmetric key encryption algorithms or secret-keyed one-way hash functions [3] . In addition, AH provides protection against IP address spoofing. IPsec allows ESP and AH to be applied to IP packets either alone or in combination with each other. The first field in the ESP header consists of the Security Parameters Index (SPI), which, in conjunction with the IP destination and the security protocol, specifies the Security Association for the packet. The Security Association (SA) indicates which algorithms and modes of operation are being used to perform the encryption and authentication [4] . The second field in the ESP header consists of the Sequence Number, which is a monotonically increasing counter value. The encrypted data block directly follows the ESP header. This block consists of at most three components: the initialization vector (IV), the ESP payload data, and the ESP tailer. The ESP Authentication Data field follows the ESP Trailer. This field contains a variable-length Integrity Check Value (ICV) that is computed over the ESP header, the ESP payload data and the ESP trailer. The ICV is calculated using either a secret-keyed hash algorithm or a symmetric key encryption algorithm. IP packet under the protection of ESP may be as IPSec has also defined a kind of Internet Exchange Key protocol (IKE) and corresponding explanation field (DOI) for supporting the treatment of IPSec packet [5] . The issues of security of network become more and more important. However, communicating over the Internet involves significant security risks since the Internet is an unprotected network. With the technology of virtual private network (VPN), many hosts can communicate securely over a public network. Most of VPN protocols consist of two major steps: the handshake and data encryption and authentication. The VPN is established through the handshake step which contains protocol and algorithm negotiation, authentication of hosts, and secret key exchanges between the hosts. So the hosts can communicate privately by encrypting and authenticating all of the data that travels over the public network. VPN works like a private network which uses a public network to connect remote sites or users together. Instead of using a real connection such as leased line, a VPN uses "virtual" connections routed through the Internet from the company's private network to the remote site or employee. Although this kind of deployment adds no security risks over and above those faced by any network that connects to the Internet, the vulnerability of the intranet with internet access introduce security threats over the network's mobile nodes that are "on the Internet" with no firewall to protect them against attacks. The protection against these threats can be a method based upon Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) and IPSec technology. Figure 3 shows VPNs for protection of Intranets. A VPN consists of two or more physical private networks that are separated by a public network and behaves as a single private network. The VPNs are built from authenticated and encrypted tunnels between secure tunneling firewalls at the border of each physical network. The firewall protects its network by admitting only those packets that have been authenticated and encrypted by one of the other firewalls. The private internal network is comprised of router, fixed computer, mobile computer, home agent etc.. All of them are under protection of firewall. Each bonding update and acknowledgement message is attached with AH and ESP to realize the authentication of identity. When the automatic key management pattern is adopted, AH and ESP also may prevent the replay attack. Users need to define a set of security policy in the practical application of IPSec according to different communication. The policy is maintained by security policy database (SPD). SPD records the each host of implementation information of IPSec. Each record includes the destination address, the IPSec protocol which needs to be realized (AH or ESP) and so on; SAD maintains some concrete security information which is known as SA records, each SA record includes SPI (Security Parameter Index) values, the destination address, the protocol, the direction, destination address and so on. Correspondingly both sides of communication need manually or automatically construct concrete protocol, key and the lifetime of key in order to protect the data, namely construct Security Associations (SA), and store it in the form of the Security Associations Database( SADB). The sender searches SA to obtain the correlative information through destination address and the protocol. With the information it implements encryption or message digist. Then AH or ESP with SPI, digist and cryption was sent to the receiver. The receiver performs decryption and digist [6] . In the figure 3 the mobile node is presented as a single-node private network protected by the integrated firewall. This kind of solution protects a mobile node through a secure tunneler. Therefore the secure tunneler is a firewall of the applicationlayer relay type that provides a cryptographically-protected path for authorized users to access a private network across a public network. The solution must provide a way by which the mobile node is able to communicate with all hosts and routers within the rest of the VPN (any of the physical, private networks) without compromising the security of those networks. Simple Key-Management protocol (SKIP) is an implementation of the method to traverse the firewall securely. We also designed an additional application which works like a firewall to provide the dynamic connection control [7] . All traffic which entered/exited MN would go through the firewall. A VPN is construct through the firewalls between MN and HA. The VPN consists of the encrypted tunnel of the firewalls which are located on the network edge. 
Model of mobile-IPv6 based on IPSec and VPN

model of mobile-IPv6
Use VPN/IPSec technology to improve the performance of security
Conclusions
The network security architecture should be robust and could deal with newly emerging attacks. This kind of architecture should provide communications throughout the Internet with confidentiality, authentication and integrity. Its work ranges from the IP layer to the application layer. At present, some methods of authentication and encryption are adopted to maintain the security of network. But some problems are not resolved soundly such as the management of key and the integration of all kinds of secure software. In this aticle we firstly analyzed the ESP, the AH and the IKE protocols defined in the IETF's IPSec architecture. Based on these protocols, protection against man in the middle attacks, reflection attacks, replay attacks and other active attacks were discussed. We note that this kind of model is quiet general and can be further extended to the Internet-wide context. It is security mechanisms, services concern authentication and encryption techniques that can prevent security attacks in the counter measures against all of these attacks.
